Please Not the Naturalist Club Again Gif

Philosophy of Science

Inductivism, Naturalism, and Metascientific Theories

David Boersema
Pacific Academy
boersema@pacificu.edu

Abstract: In this paper I will argue that, while inductivism as a view concerning scientific theories has been discredited, the (often implicit) criteria for evaluating metascientific theories is in fact primarily inductivist. The very philosophical customs that has condemned and eschewed inductivism for scientific theories in fact applies inductivism for its own metascientific theories. While somewhat troubling, matters are compounded for those advocating a naturalist stance toward metascientific theories, since those advocates suggest that there is non (or should non exist) a sharp sectionalisation betwixt scientific theories and metascientific theories.

In this paper (1) I will argue that, while inductivism equally a view apropos scientific theories has been discredited, the (often implicit) criteria for evaluating metascientific theories is in fact primarily inductivist. The very philosophical customs that has condemned and eschewed inductivism for scientific theories in fact applies inductivism for its own metascientific theories. While somewhat troubling, matters are compounded for those advocating a naturalist stance toward metascientific theories, since those advocates advise that there is not (or should not be) a sharp division betwixt scientific theories and metascientific theories..

(Expert) scientific theories

I will commencement with proposed criteria for a expert scientific theory:

(1) Extensivity - information technology correlates a large amount of phenomena.

(2) Fecundity - it stimulates new research.

(three) Predictive/explanatory power - it is testable and passes tests every bit well as existence unifying. .

(four) Simplicity - it consists of as few assumptions, laws, etc. as is needed.

(5) Coherence - information technology is internally consistent too as externally consistent with other established observations, laws, theories, etc.

(half dozen) Plasticity - it should be (relatively) easily modifiable to adjust new information.

(7) Quantifiability? (Without a doubt, theories that are precise and accurate are preferable to those that aren't. If precision and accuracy are a office of quantifiability, and then that is a criterion of a adept theory, though it is non obvious that quantifiability is necessary. Nonetheless, all other criteria being met, this does seem to be a virtue.)

There might well be other criteria for a good scientific theory, but I believe these seven are uncontroversial. Are these the criteria we would use to evaluate metascientific theories? I believe not, at to the lowest degree non all of these criteria.

What evaluative criteria do we apply to metascientific theories? I volition address this by providing an case of a electric current debate in scientific discipline, namely the on-going debate almost mass extinctions of life on the earth. Showtime I volition give a very brief summary of that argue inside the scientific community, then advise how metascientific theories speak to this contend. At that indicate, I will await at the criteria used to evaluate these rival metascientific theories. Having washed that, I volition, in the last section of this newspaper, indicate why I see metascientific theories equally essentially inductivist and remark on why this is especially troublesome for advocates of naturalism.

Mass extinctions case written report

one. Scientific concerns

Briefly stated, the Nemesis hypothesis is this: A star with an orbit elliptical to the plane of our solar system has come close enough to our solar system every 26 million years so as to disrupt the Oort Cloud, a hypothetical bubble of material enveloping our solar arrangement; the effect of this disruption has been that some of this textile was deflected toward the inner planets and subsequently, in the forms of asteroids or meteorites, has bombarded the Earth with the resulting impacts causing mass extinctions of life. The nigh famous victims of one such bombardment were the dinosaurs at the end of the Cretaceous menstruum.

This characterization of the Nemesis hypothesis, as simple as information technology is, is really rather circuitous considering it carries with it several other hypotheses. These other hypotheses include the post-obit: (1) in that location have been mass extinction events (i.e., relatively sudden and widespread extinctions of a big percentage of species) of terrestrial life, (2) there has been a periodicity to these mass extinctions, (3) the periodicity is ane of approximately 26 million years, (4) the periodicity has an extra-terrestrial cause, (5) that extra-terrestrial crusade is Nemesis, and (6) the mass extinction of life at the Cretaceous-Tertiary, or K/T, boundary (65 million years ago), including the extinction of dinosaurs, was acquired past the impact of an actress-terrestrial body (and indirectly acquired by Nemesis).

Each hypothesis in this web of hypotheses has been championed and challenged independently of the others. For case, not anybody in the scientific customs accepts the impact view with respect to the extinction at the K/T boundary (e.grand., Orth, (2) Hallam (3) ). Indeed, non everyone accepts that there was an extinction outcome at the K/T boundary (Briggs (4) ). Even accepting touch on for that item extinction event does not entail accepting periodicity of extinction events (e.k., Stigler & Wagner (v) ). Similarly, accepting periodicity does not entail accepting a periodicty of 26 million years (east.grand., Rampino & Strothers (6) ), nor does it entail acceptance of Nemesis as the crusade of periodicity (e.g., Rampino & Strothers, Schwartz & James (vii) ).

A sketchy chronology of piece of work with respect to these hypotheses is as follows: In 1977 Fischer & Arthur (8) published a newspaper postulating a periodicty of mass extinctions of 32 1000000 years. This paper was met with some criticism, but by and large with silence. (7 years earlier, Digby McLaren, in his presidential address to the Paleontological Club, had suggested impact as the cause of a mass extinction 365 meg years agone.) In June 1980, the research team led by Louis Alvarez published its famous paper (9) suggesting an extra-terrestrial affect equally the cause of the extinctions at the K/T boundary. The predominant evidence was the pronounced levels of iridium at the boundary. (By the stop of 1983, the Alvarez team reported at to the lowest degree 22 sites, scattered around the globe, exhibiting the iridium anomoly at the K/T purlieus.) The initial Alvarez paper was immediately criticized in terms of its evidence and its conclusions. Challenges included whether the iridium anomoly was a truthful anomoly, whether information technology entails an actress-terrestrial cause, where the impact crater is, whether a single catastrophic outcome could account for late Cretaceous extinctions (which plain span numbers of centuries).

In early 1984, Raup & Sepkoski (10) appear a periodicity of mass extinctions of 26 million years, based on computer simulations producing a 'best fit' analysis of family extinctions. This analysis was immediately criticized and continues to be. In Apr 1984 2 causes were proposed to account for a 26 1000000 yr periodicity. Beginning, Rampino & Strothers too every bit Schwartz & James suggested that periodicity is caused past our solar arrangement's oscillation with respect to the galactic aeroplane. 2d, both Whitmore & Jackson (11) and Davis, Hut & Muller (12) suggested an unseen companion to our lord's day. This notwithstanding-to-be-institute star was baptized 'Nemesis'. In January 1985, Whitmore & Matese (13) offered a 3rd proposal, that the cause of the periodicity is an unseen tenth planet in our solar system, which they dubbed 'Planet X'. Meanwhile, by the beginning of 1985, corroborating evidence for the Alvarez merits of impact included Luck & Turekian's (14) show of anomolous levels of osmium isotope ratios at the K/T purlieus, Bohor'southward (fifteen) findings of shocked quartz at the One thousand/T boundary sites, likewise as reports of world-wide distribution of iridium anomolies at the K/T purlieus. The iii proposals - galactic oscillation, a tenth planet, a companion star - all met with criticisms. The galactic oscillation view, while requiring no new or mysterious ontological objects, suffered the fate of not beingness in sync with the purported mass extinctions. As the solar system bobs up and downward relative to the galactic airplane, the mass extinctions should have occurred when the solar system was approaching the galactic plane, just that has not happened. The Planet X view received petty attention, but suffered the fate of the planet not having been found. This is true likewise for Nemesis (i.e., not having been constitute), simply its defenders merits information technology is less likely that we would have missed a planet in our solar organization than a (very likely dim) star which is not within our solar system, but only approaches information technology enough to take its gravitational field touch on the Oort Cloud.

The summer of 1986 brought renewed objection to an extra-terrestrial crusade of extinction at the G/T purlieus and increased skepticism of an extra-terrestrial cause for whatever other extinction event. These objections included claims for large-spread volcanism every bit the causal amanuensis (e.one thousand., Loper (16) ), questions apropos whether at that place was truly a sudden extinction event at One thousand/T (e.g., Hallam), and a lack of bear witness for the K/T bear on site (i.e., a crater). At the same time, $.25 of further bear witness - if not corroborating the impact hypothesis and the periodicity hypothesis, so at least beingness consistent with them - included the discovery of an impact crater off the coast of Nova Scotia, dated at 200 million years ago. By the stop of 1988, the impact hypothesis had gained more adherents, especially with respect to impact at the K/T boundary. However, proponents of terrestrial mechanisms for extinction pointed to data that did not fit the impact (or periodicity) view. An credible extinction result 92 million years ago contained evidence (such every bit enhanced levels of scandium and titanium, more than characteristic of material from the Earth'south upper mantle than from meteorites or asteroids) that was deemed more hands explainable by volcanic activity. In addition paleoclimactic studies seemed to indicate that there was significant cooling of the Earth merely prior to the Grand/T extinction. By early 1989 2 additional pieces of show bolstered the impact view: McHone & Nieman's (17) isolation of stishovite (having been plant simply at crater sites and very rare in the Globe's chaff) at the K/T boundary, along with Zhao & Bada's (eighteen) discovery of 2 rare amino acids (blastoff-amino-isobutyric acid and racemic isovaline), usually associated with meteorites.

Past the early 1990's, no impact site had been conclusively identified as the point of K/T impact, though several had been suggested (and rejected), including sites in Iowa, Cuba and Haiti. Past the end of 1992, however, an impact site on the Yucatan peninsula, Chicxulub, had been identified as the K/T impact site and past the end of 1994 was accustomed by most investigators as 'the real thing'. On the other hand, the volcanists continued to bespeak non only to the Deccan Traps of India every bit evidence of volcanic activity equally the most likely mechanism of extinctions, but claimed the discovery of vast deposits of volcanic basalts, known as the Siberian Traps, to be further corroboration of their position. In addition, several pieces of evidence claimed by proponents of impact as supporting the impact hypothesis came nether challenge, including the merits that a variety of forminifera suddenly became extinct at the Yard/T boundary. Keller (19) and others argued that they did non all of a sudden get extinct, just gradually died out.

The upshot of this is that at the end of 1994, none of the diverse hypotheses associated with 'the Nemesis hypothesis' has been established to the complete satisfaction of the scientific community. The hypotheses that there have been mass extinctions and that there was an extinction event at the K/T purlieus enjoy the greatest credence by the relevant investigators. Fifty-fifty the hypothesis that the K/T extinction was caused by touch on is accepted by a majority of scientists. The hypotheses of periodicity of extinction events and specifically of the specific timing and crusade of such periodicity have received far less support and have been treated much more than every bit (more or less promising) speculation.

2. Metascientific concerns

There are, of grade, a variety of facets of science which philosophers attend to in the procedure of analyzing the norms and practices of science. These facets range from the gathering of information (e.grand., observation, measurement, experimentation) to organizing such information (due east.k., models, theories, paradigms) to bookkeeping for such information (due east.thou., caption, prediction, hypothesis testing, reduction). At that place are numerous ways in which the conduct of the scientific community exhibited these facets and information technology would exist beneficial for philosophers of science to expect carefully at these numerous ways. For instance, with respect to data gathering and hypothesis germination, a diverseness of experimental techniques were used, including thought experiments, estimator simulation experiments, as well every bit 'traditional' one-shot case studies. Or, the multiple interpretations, reinterpretations, and apparent invulnerability to falsification of much of the proposed bear witness both for and against bear upon can provide fecund material for both philosophers and sociologists of scientific discipline. Hither, notwithstanding, I want to focus on the bug of theory evaluation and alter/progress in science. How, especially since the 1980 Alvarez article, has the scientific community dealt with the Nemesis hypothesis (and its attendent hypotheses of bear upon, periodicity, etc.)? Has the scientific community acted in ways that have been captured adequately by models proposed by philosophers of science (e.g., Kuhn)? If not, and if these proposed models are meant prescriptively, has the scientific community acted 'irrationally' or in ways that could exist aided past such models? I will accost these questions by concentrating on the model proposed past Kuhn. (20)

Kuhnian language and characterizations often are used past scientific commentators, including those who accept dealt with the Nemesis hypothesis (e.yard., Glen (21) , Muller (22) ). That is, they often characterize the activities of the scientific community in Kuhnian terms. Can we properly do and then? I remember not. While sure features of this history fit Kuhn'southward model, in that location are other telling features that practice not. First, despite the claims by various scientists (e.chiliad., Gould (23) , Hsu (24) ) that the controversy over Nemesis and impact arose because information technology represented a neo-catastrophist challenge to the reigning uniformitarian paradigm, information technology is difficult if not impossible to bear witness that the pre-Alvarez work was substantially different than the post-Alvarez work. 'Normal science' did not change, nor has there been a 'gestalt switch' in which data and phenomema are now incommersurable with pre-Alvarez claims and assumptions. Indeed, advocates on both sides of the various hypotheses signal to the same bear witness, the aforementioned analytic techniques, etc. to make their case. Much of the 'standard paradigm', if there is one, of practicing paleontologists has remained untouched, for case, a commitment to plate tectonics. It certainly is the example that, with a strong advocacy for volcanism alongside with the strong advancement for touch, there is no dominant paradigm at nowadays. Nor could one make a strong case that the paleontological community is in a period of crisis; there yet is widespread consensus on what questions are important to pursue and what techniques are to be followed. Few proponents of touch on have been deterred from their view by the presence of apparently inconsistent or even falsifying data (east.g., evidence for the gradual decline and extinction of species prior to the K/T boundary). Nor have many proponents of volcanism been deterred from their view by the presence of apparently inconsistent or falsifying data (eastward.grand., stichovite and shocked quartz at crater sites). Changes that are occurring in the scientific community are not the result of dramatic, sudden gestalt switches even though a gradual acceptance of catastrophism seems to be taking place and is a significant conceptual change.

Metascientific inductivism and Naturalism

How, in practice, do we decide whether or not, say, Kuhn'due south theory of scientific change is a skilful theory? I want to claim that basically nosotros wait at specific cases or episodes in the history of scientific discipline to see if they match Kuhn'south theory, in much the way I take tried to illustrate with the mass extinctions instance above. We don't seem to need of metascientific theories, say, predictability or fecundity or the various other criteria which we demand of scientific theories. Instead, we look to run across, for example, did the plate tectonics revolution fit Kuhn'due south view (or Laudan's or...)? Or, did the modern synthesis of evolutionary theory and genetics fit Kuhn's view, etc.? Our appraisals of these metascientific theories apparently involve looking for descriptive cases which assistance to back up the metascientific theory or not, a position remarkably similar inductivism. I, at least, have seen nothing along the lines of asking what the Kuhnian theory would predict will happen in the mass extinctions debates or suggest some strategy for how such debates will or should be conducted (i.e., we haven't demanded fecundity of Kuhn'south view). Yes, of course, we insist on internal consistency within a metascientific theory, but when push comes to shove, what really seems to matter is: did Kuhn get information technology right descriptively (and descriptively, always with respect to the past).

Assuming that what I take said here is correct, one might object that information technology is quite inappropriate to demand the aforementioned evaluative criteria for metascientific theories as nosotros do for scientific theories. Philosophy, after all, is not science, so why evaluate it according to criteria reserved for science? My point here is not to answer that question directly, but to insist that such an objection should not be available to proponents of naturalism, to which I at present turn.

It is not clear to me whether naturalism should be conceived as a theory, a stance, an approach, a commitment, or yet fifty-fifty something else. As Barry Stroud (25) recently said in an APA President's Address: "'Naturalism' seems to me...rather like 'World Peace.' Almost everyone swears allegiance to it, and is willing to march under its banner. But disputes can still break out virtually what it is appropriate or adequate to do in the proper name of that slogan." Nevertheless, he sees two basic aspects (or, possibly, versions) of naturalism, first, an ontological attribute ("a view of what is so, or the way things are, or what in that location is in the world") and, second, a methodological (or epistemic) aspect ("a manner of studying or investigating what there is in the world").

Alex Rosenberg (26) characterizes naturalism in philosophy via four features: (1) The repudiation of 'get-go philosophy'. (Epistemology is not to exist treated every bit a propaedeutic to the acquisition of further cognition.); (2) Scientism. (The sciences are to be the guide to epistemology and metaphysics.); (3) Darwinism. (To a large extent Darwinian theory is to be both the model of scientific theorizing and the guide to philosophical theory considering information technology maximally combines relevance to human being affairs and well-foundedness.); (4) Progressivity. (Arguments from the history or sociology of science to the non-rationality, or not-cumulativity, or non-progressive character of science, are either unsound or invalid.)

And, of course, the locus classicus , for epistemic naturalism at least, is Quine (27) : "With Dewey I concur that cognition, mind and meaning are part of the aforementioned world that they have to exercise with, and that they are to be studied in the aforementioned empirical spirit that animates natural science. There is no place for a prior philosophy."

My point, I assume, is obvious. If nosotros accept a naturalist stand, then the division between scientific theories and metascientific theories is, at all-time, a difference of degree and not of kind. There seems to be no obvious reason, then, why evaluative criteria for them should be (very) different. What criteria should be used to evaluate metascientific theories? My immediate answer is: I don't know. My 2nd answer is: the criteria for evaluating annihilation is dependent upon the purpose(s) or use(due south) of that matter (e.thousand., what counts as a good spoon depends on the purpose(southward) or utilize(southward) of spoons; what counts equally a expert theory depends upon the purpose(s) or use(s) of theories). Then, what is/are the purpose(s) of metascientific theories? Apparently, given how nosotros in fact evaluate metascientific theories, to describe scientific practice. That, it strikes me, is non very satisfactory for philosophy, as it relegates philosophy to a purely parasitic, descriptive role. However, I will not here propose more. My purpose, instead, has only been to advise that there is a business concern to exist addressed, a problem to exist solved. Information technology should first be decided if this is correct, if there truly is a problem. If there is, I presume a solution will be forthcoming.

Notes

(ane) An earlier version of this paper was read at the Irish gaelic Philosophical Society almanac bound conference, February 1997.

(2) C. J. Orth, et al., "An iridium abundance anomoly at the palynological Cretaceous-3rd boundary in northern New United mexican states" Scientific discipline 214 (1981): 1341-43.

(iii) A. Hallam, "Stop-Cretaceous mass extinction event: argument for terrestrial causation" Scientific discipline 238 (1987): 1237-42.

(iv) J. C. Briggs, "Mass extinctions: fact or fallacy?" In Glen (run into note 23 beneath). Pages 230-36.

(5) S. M. Stigler & 1000. J. Wagner. "Response to D. M. Raup and J. J. Sepkoski, Jr., 'Testing for periodicity of extinction'" Science 241 (1988): 96-8.

(half dozen) M. R. Rampino & R .B. Strothers. "Terrestrial mass extinctions, cometary impacts and the Dominicus's motility perpendicular to the galactic plane" Nature 308 (1984): 709-12.

(vii) R. D. Schwartz & P. B. James. "Periodic mass extinctions and the Sunday's oscillation nearly the galactic aeroplane" Nature 308 (1984): 712-13.

(8) A. G. Fischer & M. A. Arthur. "Secular variations in the pelagic realm" In H. East.Cook & P. Enos (eds.) Deep-h2o Carbonate Environments, Soc. of Econ. Paleontol. and Mineral. Spec. Publ. 25 (1977): xix-50.

(9) L. Alvarez, et al. "Extraterrestrial cause for the Cretaceous-Tertiary extinction" Science 208 (1980): 1095-1108.

(10) D. M. Raup & J. J. Sepkoski. "Periodicity of extinctions in the geologic past" Proceedings of the National Academy of the Sciences 81 (1984): 801-5.

(11) D. P. Whitmire & A. A. Jackson. "Are periodic mass extinctions driven by a distant solar companion?" Nature 308 (1984): 713-fifteen.

(12) One thousand. Davis, P. Hut & R. A. Muller. "Extinction of species by periodic comet showers" Nature 308 (1984): 715-17.

(13) D. P. Whitmire & J. J. Matese. "Periodic comet showers and Comet 10" Nature 313 (1985): 36-38.

(14) J. Chiliad. Luck & K. K. Turekian. "Osmium-187/Osmium-186 in manganese nodules and the Cretaceous-Tertiary boundary" Scientific discipline 222 (1983): 613-15.

(xv) B. F. Bohor, et al. "Shocked quartz in the Cretaceous-3rd boundary clays: prove for a global distribution" Science 236 (1987): 705-8.

(16) D. Eastward. Loper "Shocked quartz found at the Thou/T boundary" Eos 69 (1988): 961, 971-2.

(17) J. F. McHone & R. L. Nieman. "One thousand/T boundary stishovite: detection past solid-land nuclear magnetic resonance and power x-ray diffraction" Geological Society of American Abstracts, 1989. A120.

(eighteen) M. Zhao & J. 50. Bada. "Extraterrestrial amino acids in Cretaceous-Tertiary boundary sediments at Stevns Klint, Denmark" Nature 339 (1989): 463-65.

(19) G. Keller "Extended Cretaceous/Tertiary purlieus extinctions and delayed population changes in planktonic foraminifera from Brazos River, Texas" Paleooceanography four (1989): 287-332.

(20) T. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. (Chicago: Academy of Chicago Press, 1962).

(21) West. Glen, (ed.) The Mass-Extinction Debates: How Science Works in a Crisis. (Stanford: Standford University Press), 1994.

(22) R. Muller, Nemesis: The Decease Star. (NY: Weidenfeld & Nicholson), 1988.

(23) S. J. Gould, "On the mass-extinction debates: an interview with Stephen Jay Gould" In Glen (come across notation 23). Pages 253-267.

(24) Chiliad. J. Hsu, "Uniformitarianism vs catastrophism in the extinction debate" In Glen (run across note 23). Pages 217-29.

(25) B. Stroud. "The Charm of Naturalism." Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Society 70 (Nov. 1996): 43-55.

(26) A. Rosenberg. "A Field Guide to Recent Species of Naturalism." British Journal of the Philosophy of Science 47 (1996): i-29.

(27) W.Five. Quine. "Ontological Relativity." In Ontological Relativity and Other Essays. New York: Columbia Academy Press, 1969. Page 26.

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